

Donald Mitchell oral histories, Archives and Special Collections, Consortium Library, University of Alaska Anchorage. Emil Notti interview, 1992 October 30. Transcript completed by Louisa Dennis. <https://archives.consortiumlibrary.org/collections/specialcollections/hmc-1099/>

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. So the tape is going, and today is October 30th, the day before Halloween, 1992. And I'm speaking with Mr. Emil Notti in his office at the Alaska Native Foundation in Anchorage. And for one of those kids or professors or someone 50 years from now, this is the second interview that I've done with Mr. Notti. There was an interview -- I went and looked at it last night -- November 15, 1989. Shows you how long I've been fooling around on this. And so if you have this tape that -- are not familiar with the other tape, you might want to look for that. Last night I went through the notes of -- of that interview and I think we sort of left our discussion -- we talked the first time about how AFN got organized, and Nick Gray and -- and Cook Inlet Native Association and -- and all the way up through the Hickel nomination. But going back and looking at it last night, I noticed -- well, I had asked you -- we talked sort of in a -- a general way that you guys went back and sort of went office to office, attempting to successfully persuade the members of the Interior Committee that -- that the land freeze was a good idea. I didn't ask you specifically what Stevens' and Gravel's reaction to that was. Did you meet with him on -- on that project and were they happy you were there? Sad you were there? Mad you were there?

MR. NOTTI: Gravel -- now, I'm trying to remember. NR. MITCHELL: Right.

MR. NOTTI: This is quite awhile ago, but I think Gravel supported it except he was responsible in part for withdrawing the pipeline corridor. So as long as the pipeline was not held up, they could proceed with construction. I believe he supported the land freeze. Stevens, I'm not sure of his reaction, but I think it would have been one of opposition to the land freeze, because he was a Hickel appointee -- just freshly appointed -- and Hickel's stand was total opposition to the land freeze. In fact, his attorney general, Edgard Paul Boyko, filed lawsuit to -- trying to get the land freeze lifted. And Stevens being a recent appointee, I think, supported that stand.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, I guess the next thing that's important that happens is -- those hearings I think are in mid-January of 1969. So you guys would have been back East in early January. And then you come back home having successfully persuaded Senator Jackson to get the -- the pledge on the land freeze from Wally Hickel. And then the next thing that happens is AFN amazingly gets hooked up with Arthur Goldberg. And -- I believe in March of 1969, in anticipation of the '69 hearings -- and I -- I'm familiar with the controversy that happens later in the spring in terms of Goldberg quitting and Boyko and all that sort of stuff now. And I'll ask about that in a second, but I'm not familiar with how AFN and Arthur Goldberg got hooked up to begin with. Is that just luck? Did you guys go looking for a national lawyer? How did that happen?

MR. NOTTI: We had been talking about finding a national lawyer because we were dealing on national scene, and a lot of the senators and congressmen were lawyers in their own right. And -- and we felt they needed to respect the group of lawyers or lawyers that we brought to our hearings with us. Our local, while they were sincere and competent, were an unknown on a national scene. So -- well, we -- we talked about it, and then it was John Borbridge who brought me the name. How he got in contact with Arthur Goldberg, I'm not sure. But we took it to the board and -- and they adopted that. They were in favor of contacting. When -- when we appeared

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at the Senate hearings, I remember testifying one day before Jackson with Arthur Goldberg on my right and Ramsey Clark on my left, former attorney general, and -- and when they spoke, the Senate hearings were a total different atmosphere. They had -- they had a great deal of respect, one being a former attorney general of the United States, and one being a former Supreme Court Justice and United Nations representative and I think an ambassador.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Well, Secretary of Labor.

MR. NOTTI: Secretary of Labor. And -- but they -- they -- and they had gone through confirmations and Senate hearings, and were well-known. And their legal opinions were respected. And I think it gave a -- some creditability to the Native land claims in Alaska to have these recognized legal experts testifying on our behalf. I remember one -- one point Jackson asked a question and Ramsey Clark answered it off-the-cuff and then said, "But, Senator, I'd be glad to brief the question for you." And Senator Jackson's answer was, "General, if that's your recollection of the law, that's good enough for me." So we had -- we had great representation, legally and politically.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Well, now in terms of Borbridge coming up with the idea -- I know that Bob Goldberg had just moved to Anchorage. Was he -- later was involved obviously with -- with Lovotna (phonetic) but was -- was he part of that at all, or do --

MR. NOTTI: I suspect it was Bob who brought the name to John Borbridge. And then Jar- -- John flew back and met with -- with Justice Goldberg.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Well, that was my other -- was going to be my next question. I know that I had seen some reference in the Tundra Times to -- to John making a trip back East. Did he -- he went by himself? You didn't go on that as AFN, or --

MR. NOTTI: I -- I didn't go back. I think maybe Willie went back.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, now, he said he didn't go back.

MR. NOTTI: No?

MR. MITCHELL: Do you need to get that, or --

MR. NOTTI: I'll let the machine get it.

MR. MITCHELL: Oh, okay. Well, the first thing that -- that happens with that is that -- is that Jackson does have these hearings on the 29th of April of 1969 to really kick off this whole process seriously. And one of the interesting things in terms of what later happened with Goldberg, in terms of people -- well, not so much Goldberg, but Ramsey Clark, really, is that he -- you know, he testified and then you testified right after him in the afternoon. And you read Goldberg's testimony and it's all sort of, you know: We got to do this social justice. These poor people. They live out in these villages. They don't have any electricity. You know, this is -- you

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know -- they're, you know, they are objects of our concern, blah, blah, blah. And in terms of the amount of land, he doesn't say. You know, he just tells Jackson that they had a -- the Natives ought to get an "adequate and reasonable," quote, unquote, amount of land. And then he goes on again with this sort of social welfare argument. All of which is quite compelling, but it was quite different. You then came in afterwards and said: Yeah, I'll tell you what "reasonable and adequate" is, it's 40 million acres in case you want to know. And sort of make the -- you know, "We have land rights," argument here. And it seemed to me that that was the earliest I could see the -- sort of the two different philosophies about why we were doing this sort of exhibiting itself. Were you guys aware of those differences at -- at that early point, or it just --

MR. NOTTI: No, we weren't. But just the fact that -- he might soft pedal our position, but the fact that when he went before the Senate he said, "This is an issue of national honor -- indeed, international importance," I think paved the way for us to make our own case and have them listen to it seriously.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, I don't want to put words in your mouth there, just that it seems that that becomes sort of important with Arctic Slope and others later on about this land right for social welfare. Actually, welfare is not the right view.

MR. NOTTI: Arctic Slope's position always was -- was that it was a land -- land-based settlement. They kept repeating it. It's not -- it's not social welfare. Arthur -- U -- Upicksoun -- Joey Upicksoun, used to say, "We are landlords," and he was very effective at it. We started at 80 million acres at one point and compromised with the promise of support from Hickel if we went to 40 million acres. And then when we got to the hearings as governor, he -- he put conditions on the 40 million acres saying if -- maybe if half of it came from federal reserves. But we did get conditioned support from the State, which we wanted. We thought it was real important to have the State support us rather than fight us.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Well, obviously you guys thought that you had hired -- well, I mean, actually, you didn't think, you had hired Arthur Goldberg, but sort of as -- as an extra add-on. Goldberg obviously went out and retained Ed Weinberg. And then there were -- Goldberg had a number of younger attorneys working with him. I think Bill Iverson was one, and at least early on there was -- I -- I've seen memos from, like, Peter Burleigh (phonetic) and Jay Greenfield. What were your impressions of those guys? Were they just sort of doing Goldberg's bidding? Were they sort of independent actors in all of this?

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. None of them really stuck around very long. They came to Anchorage for one or two meetings, and then they were replaced. They were feeding the information, I felt, to -- to Goldberg, but they weren't on their own right here. I think Goldberg ran into trouble with local attorneys when he went before the Senate and said he was not accepting a personal fee for his services. He did charge for his associates' time -- these people you just named. But his -- he did not get a fee himself. When the senators found out that the local attorneys had 10 percent contracts, 10 percent land, and 10 percent in money of any settlement, he asked every attorney to submit their contracts to the committee. And when they did, they -- the Congress voided them and said they would not allow 10 percent contracts. And the local attorneys were very unhappy

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with that and -- and there was -- there was a lot of -- well, unhappiness. Even trying to get AFN to get rid of Goldberg.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Well, I know that -- that -- I haven't talked to Bob about Goldberg, but as I understand the -- sort of the straw that broke the camel's back on all of that was I guess Boyko, down in Kodiak, had gone to the press and said that -- that Goldberg was trying to get 10 percent of the goods, which was then, you know, \$50 million or something. And so Goldberg quit in a huff, and then when there was this AFN board meeting about all of this, amazingly the vote to accept Goldberg's resignation lost on a 10/10 split according to the Tundra Times. And -- and that sort of surprised me in terms of there being that much opposition to Goldberg if it was a 10/10 split. Why were people -- you know, who were those 10 votes that didn't want him around? Were they just all people trapped by their -- their own regional counsel, or did they -- were there concerns about Goldberg, or --

MR. NOTTI: Well, I -- I think the attorneys were heavily involved in -- in influencing the clients. When -- as president of AFN I would have a -- a disagreement with some of the regions on some of their stands. Their -- their attorneys would get politically involved and try to unseat me. And they would make -- some of them even made public statements about their stand on issues, which I thought was inappropriate. We had a meeting one time at AFN where we wanted to meet without the attorneys, and the attorneys argued against -- they said that they represented the clients and were -- had a right to be in the room in any discussion we had. And it went to a vote of the board, and it was a tie vote. I cast the tie-breaking vote in favor of meeting by ourselves. And so the attorneys, I think, had a great deal to do with influencing the -- that vote.

MR. MITCHELL: Under -- under Goldberg?

MR. NOTTI: Right.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, in terms of -- of that April 1969 hearing, the point of that hearing, of course, was to take testimony at that point on -- on the legislation that -- that Scoop Jackson had just introduced, which was SAT 30 (phonetic). You may or may not remember the number, which was the -- the bill that the field committee had -- had given to Jackson. And it was different from -- from the old Hickel task bill on a number of respects. And I guess the first question about that is that that bill was obviously the result of -- of almost a year's worth of -- of work putting together Alaska Natives in the land that -- that Hicock and Fitzgerald, and Bob Arnold, and people have done over at the field committee. And were you guys involved in that at all? Did they involve you in putting together Alaska Natives in the land?

MR. NOTTI: No, no. They -- we weren't involved in any of the decision-making. And I was kind of surprised by the -- the recommendations. If I remember right, they were -- their land recommendations were pretty small.

MR. MITCHELL: Oh, it was next to nothing.

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MR. NOTTI: And -- but that was in spite of -- in the book for Alaska Natives in the land, they said it took -- my memory is not real good on this, but I think it said it took twelve- -- 12,000 acres or 120,000 acres. That -- that number sticks for some reason. To foraging -- to -- to have an equivalent of cash income of \$1,800 a year. Which said you needed a great deal of land to subsist, and our request at the time was to protect the subsistence hunting rights of the villagers. And --

MR. MITCHELL: Hold on. We were talking about the field committee recommendation. I know my recollection is that -- that they said -- was if you wanted to protect the subsistence economy, you needed a land settlement of 60 or 80 million and that was said sort of out front. And -- and what they had, of course, is they had -- they had sort of a subsistence system sort of like the great, great, great, great grandparent of Title VIII of ANILCA. But then in terms of the actual land and fee, they were only going to give out literally like 3.5 million, I think, initially. It was real small. The other thing was that they had come up with this idea of having -- rather than the regional corporations that obviously the AFN regional organizations were already becoming very attracted to, the field committee recommendation was just to have two statewide corporations. And I couldn't really find in the -- in the April '69 hearing records any testimony at that point on how you guys felt about that. How did people feel about the idea of statewide versus regional?

MR. NOTTI: I don't think we ever addressed it. We just kept plunging ahead with our own position because everybody had -- had a billing, you know, our first bill would have given us title to all of Alaska --

MR. MITCHELL: Right.

MR. NOTTI: -- fortunately. And then the next five years, everybody had a bill. The administration had a bill, BIA had a bill, State of Alaska had a bill, the Interior where committees had a bill. And the final result was kind of -- a amalgamation of all these ideas. And we -- lost -- we lost some major points in our bill over our -- our position on what a settlement ought to be.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, one of the other things that happens that summer -- we've already talked about the fact that -- that Ramsey Clark gets involved. Did -- did you know that Clark was going to end up being your lawyer at the time you got Goldberg that he mentioned this? Or did Clark just show up one day and say, "Arthur's offering the governor of New York," which I think is what he was off spending most of his time doing? How did he sort of get involved?

MR. NOTTI: Well, I don't remember exactly, but Goldberg associated him, and he came to our hearings and then just started filling in. And then when Goldberg left he was just kind of the senior -- senior lawyer. Up until that point, AFN was mainly represented by the regional lawyers. We did have, for a short time, some attorneys who also represented some of the regions. Maybe even half -- as many as half of the regions had the same lawyer. And they just kind of took over as AFN's legal advisors and then quit. And so we -- we didn't have attorneys within AFN. We just kind of depended on -- on the regional lawyers because they put together the regions' positions, and they had come together and they had argued amongst the -- our -- before our

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board, and then we would adopt the views that would -- suited the group as a whole without advice specifically for AFN, because we were just carrying water for the regions.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, sort of after that April hearing and Ramsey Clark coming -- coming on board -- but really -- at least as I can look back at the record it wasn't -- does not appear to be a lot of activity until the fall of '69. The first real Senate of Interior executive sessions were in the fall -- I think, in -- in November of '69. And -- and I think it looks like to me that -- that -- did you move with your family back to Washington for awhile then?

MR. NOTTI: Yeah.

MR. MITCHELL: In the fall of '69?

MR. NOTTI: I did. For about three months. We were running into heavy opposition from the State in spite of our efforts who we -- you know, we -- we wanted to go arm in arm with the State and have the State testify and say let's settle it, and -- and agree with us on some of our major points. But the State under Hickel filed lawsuit and was really opposing a lot that we did. Even though he funded the rural commission and tried to get some consensus, AFN came to some agreement, but the State wouldn't agree with us what we had -- we wanted. So they opposed us in Congress, and I always had the feeling that the Senate was -- was reluctant to take a stand in opposition to a governor. And so nothing happened for awhile and Hickel became Secretary of Interior. Miller opposed us, but was not very active. The rural commission died.

MR. MITCHELL: Did it just die because Miller didn't want to use it? Is that basically what happened?

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. Maybe they defunded it, too. And then so nothing much happened until Egan got in. And he even grabbed it and supported it. He -- not the concepts of it, but he said, "Let's settle it." And soon as there was no opposition from a governor for settlement, that's when things started to happen again.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Well, you -- you jumped ahead of me a little bit.

MR. NOTTI: I jumped ahead of you by a year.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. About a year. And I was going to get to Miller, but we might as well talk about him now. I mean, originally, Miller had -- had -- at that April 1969 hearing he had -- that was his first appearance as governor after Hickel had -- had promoted him by leaving. And he seems like a relatively solid citizen whose testimony is just sort of -- is consistent with Hickel's in terms of -- of the Hickel task force bill. And then right in that November -- I guess right after you had -- had moved to Washington and the Senate Committee was actually getting ready to go and do a markup on this thing -- all of a sudden Miller sends Jackson a couple of letters saying the State has completely reevaluated its position. And the State refuses to participate in the settlement financially. And the State doesn't think that these people ought to be given land. And, you know, this is your problem, not mine. You know, no help from us here.

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Blah, blah, blah. So I guess the first question is -- what was your opinion of Miller up to that point, and were you guys -- did -- did that come as a -- a surprise to you guys when he sort of repudiated any -- even the participation Hickel had -- had reluctantly been giving?

MR. NOTTI: I think we kind of expected it. He was -- he was just following Hickel's lead for awhile, and then he was taken over by advisors. He, himself, I don't think, formed any -- any policies except his -- instinctively he was against any kind of a settlement. So when his advisors took a stand and advised him that way, it was easy for him to adopt it. But he was never -- well, his -- the result of that was inaction on the part of Congress.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Well, actually, before we leave that -- a number of people have told me that they thought Miller was sort of captured -- you know, whichever way the wind blew in terms of his own -- his own people. And -- and the -- only two people I've been able to theorize really had sort of control over him, one was, of course, Bob Ward, who was lieutenant governor, and then I guess Ken Elwood was his attorney general. And they -- are those basically the two guys that --

MR. NOTTI: Advised him?

MR. MITCHELL: Advised him. Or who did -- was there anybody else that was really leaning on him about that?

MR. NOTTI: Internally, I think those were the ones, but there was probably some outside influence, too. Donald Burr had been attorney general under Hickel -- his first attorney general. And I think he might still have been active. I can't identify anybody else on the outside, but I -- I suspect that he just kind of yielded to -- to outside pressure and his internal advisors. And it was easy to do because he -- he agreed with them.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well --

MR. NOTTI: And he was looking at reelection.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. And obviously made the bad assessment of that -- we'll talk about it in a second. But as you go into that markup in November of '69 -- I've talked to Bill Vaness about it -- and he was -- of course, these are all secret at the time. And so he was one of the few people that was in the room being the committee's lawyer. And he says -- he sort of smiles even to this day that the -- the first -- the first meeting -- just as I was telling you yesterday about how the first meeting of the committee in January of '69 (indiscernible) Stevens and Gravel arguing with each other that -- that they went in to mark up the claims act in November of '69, and the entire meeting was taken over with Steven's and Gravel arguing with each other and -- and Jackson. And they were arguing. I guess Gravel was supporting you guys on the royalty concept, and Stevens said, "A royalty over my dead body." And they -- almost every one of the major policy issues, according to Bill, that the media would -- as soon as Scoop would bring one of these issues up, it would deteriorate with Stevens' and Gravel arguing with each other. And -- and he eventually told them, "Hey, Scoop, we're not going to do anything here until you guys go out and

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get a position together." And so I guess the -- the first question about all that is -- assuming you didn't move back now, what were Stevens and Gravel's positions? Were you guys getting along with Stevens? Getting along with Gravel better? How important was this royalty business? What was happening at that point?

MR. NOTTI: Gravel is generally more supportive. I don't know in detail how he himself believed about all this stuff, but -- but -- but he supported us just by his meeting with us and telling us where he stood on a lot of these things. He -- he was much more helpful. Stevens, on the other hand, was open about his opposition to 2 percent in perpetuity. And that's the one that sticks out in my mind, but generally he -- he was not all that helpful in -- in details. And overall he -- he opposed the statewide corporation. I think it was Stevens who was mainly responsible for the 200 village corporations, which I think doomed many of them to failure because they were just too small and didn't have the resource base or money base to be successful. So -- but -- but he was open about it.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, how about -- how about on the land question in terms of the size of the land settlement at that point in the process?

MR. NOTTI: I don't remember his stand on that.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, the reason I ask is because they do go off and do that. And they -- as a matter -- they're already not getting along with each other, obviously, and they suck it up and sit down and apparently hammer out sort of a Stevens/Gravel conceptual compromise. Which -- which in December of '69 -- I don't know, I guess, do you have the whole AFN board back at that point? Well, it seems to be a lot of people that were in town, not just --

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. Yeah. We used to have the whole AFN board back then. That -- when they came to an agreement, the -- the opposition then shifted to the White House on -- to the 40 million acres.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Well, you guys repudiated that agreement. So as -- as I understand it, and I'm -- somewhere in my files I've got a copy of it, was that they had hammered together this agreement where Stevens had given up on the royalty. He agreed to support the concept of the royalty but for a fixed period of time. And it was, like, 10 years or something. And -- and they had a variety of other things they'd agreed to, and according to both Fred Paul and Woodwire (phonetic), and actually Vaness, too. He thinks he remembers walking by, but their recollection was that the whole AFN board was back in Washington in December, and that there was this big meeting. And one day when the Senate of Interior committee hearing (indiscernible), Stevens and Gravel sort of distributed this deal. And Eben Hopson and everybody just went through the roof because they sort of left out land. They had -- they had pretty much, you know, everything within the -- the ballpark of negotiation, but there was no land with component bill. The land wasn't much better than the field committee bill. And that's why Jackson eventually -- when -- when -- when you guys repudiated that, Stevens and Gravel couldn't go forward with it and Jackson said, "To hell with it." And they had to start over again in that spring of 1970. Does that ring a bell at all? Do you remember the number --

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MR. NOTTI: The deal?

MR. MITCHELL: -- any of that or Hopson being upset, or --

MR. NOTTI: Well, the North Slope was always upset. They pulled out of AFN a couple of times on issues -- came back in, but I don't remember that, specifically.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, the other thing that I haven't asked you at this point is about AFN finances. Now you've never -- you mentioned that -- that you're back there -- so if you were back, say, for three months, that would be, like, say, November, December, January, something like that.

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. Actually I came back end of December.

MR. MITCHELL: End of December.

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. So I went back maybe in September even -- September, October.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. So you went -- you mean you went home at the end of December.

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. Came back to Alaska.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. What was the AFN lobby at that point? You were there, obviously, for that period of time every day. And obviously the lawyers they had, Weinberg and the Iverson and those guys, were around because they lived in Washington. Was -- and I guess -- was Charlie there? Who -- who else was there on an ongoing basis?

MR. NOTTI: No one on an ongoing basis, but seemed like someone was always in town. Charlie or Willie or Eben or Borbridge. There was always somebody rotating in and out. And we were, every day, working with the lawyers and up on the Hill going door to door.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, I was -- that was my -- my next question, which was -- that spring of 1970, the committee starts really from scratch to write a bill. And the way that Jackson did it, was that he seems to have done it by concepts. Sort of the famous Jackson conceptual markup, which is: Agree to these concepts -- and then that's the hard part guys. And then after all the concepts are all agreed to, then we'll just have Bill Vaness draw up -- just type all these concepts up into a bill. And that process goes on January, February, March, April. And were you -- you weren't back there then day to day for that process?

MR. NOTTI: No.

MR. MITCHELL: You guys were still just doing the summer rotation?

MR. NOTTI: Right.

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MR. MITCHELL: And do you recall in terms of this going door to door, the -- the big problem appears to be that there were a lot of conservative Republicans. Gordon Allott, who was the ranking minority, a guy from Colorado, and I guess also this fellow Fannon from -- from New Mexico, Arizona, who was just apparently adamantly opposed to giving out land. And did you recall meeting with those guys at all?

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. That was -- I was a lot younger and it used to be scary. But I'd make an appointment, go in and screw up my courage, and -- and in the face of a known opposition, I knew how they'd feel and they'd be scowling at me, and I would -- I would make my case. And then some of them openly disagreed with me, but I just kept on making the arguments for what we wanted. But yeah, we -- all those guys. I mean a lot of those guys totally disagreed with what we --

MR. MITCHELL: So how did -- so then how did you handle them, is basically sort of Jackson and Stevens -- really had to deal with -- somehow that bill came out of the committee with-- without their -- there wasn't much land in it. That's one of the reasons the bill got out of the committee, but --

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. I don't know how they did it internally.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay.

MR. NOTTI: But they -- they knew our feelings because we -- we talked to all of them.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, the -- the other thing that happens in the spring of 1970, which later turns out to be very important, is that in April of 1970 is when Judge Hart, there in -- back in D.C., issues the Stevens Village injunction that says that -- that the pipeline is not going to cross lands owned by Stevens Village until -- as long as they have their claims unresolved. And -- and that obviously, in terms of what happened with the White House later, and a whole variety of things, that was a very important display of what -- what the problem was. And -- and I had lunch with David Wolf last week to talk a little about that. And one of the things that -- that surprised me, because I had just assumed the opposite without knowing, is that he said that that whole lawsuit -- that he does not recall any coordination with AFN about the filing of that lawsuit or -- or whether all this was a good idea. And -- and I found that interesting because at the time Al Ketzler was both the head of TCC and he was also working for you, I think, as -- as the deputy executive director under Willie. You were the president. I was wondering how -- is that true to your recollection? Did David remember it right? That you guys were sort of not in the loop on that, or --

MR. NOTTI: That's true. We weren't involved in encouraging it or arguing for it or anything. But if I remember right, their attorneys were probably also attending AFN board meetings. So in that sense they -- they were very aware of our position at AFN, and -- I -- I don't know. Their intent I'm sure was to try to help, which it did whether they intended to or not, but it did help.

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MR. MITCHELL: Right. Well, actually it gets to the -- to the -- to the realness. And that is -- you know, the other thing that surprised me about my chat with David was that he said -- you know -- and I said, "Well, I assume what you guys were out to do, of course, was to stop the pipeline until -- until claim -- the Native claims were settled." Therefore from putting more pressure on the assisted villages in getting their claims settled. But he says, "Oh, no. Absolutely not. What we were -- the only reason that lawsuit got filed was -- is because as a tactic to -- to persuade TAPS to keep the promises that they had made to the villages that agreed with the summit. And if they had kept those promises we never would have filed the lawsuit." And so then I went back and sort of looked at the Tundra Times, and -- and lo and behold what I found is that back in, you know, the summer of '69, that, you know, TAPS tried to get, you know, Copper River and TCC and everybody and, you know, got them to sign waivers to let the pipeline go forward. And in exchange, you know, the villages did the same thing in those regions. And -- and in exchange, everybody was going to get -- they weren't going to pay any money for the right-of-way, that everybody was going to get these jobs and there were going to be all these contracts. And -- and it's obviously easy to look back on, but that really gave up the best leverage. I mean, stop at what you were saying there was that if you guys would give us these contracts, we will let the pipeline go forward. And if the pipeline went forward, of course, nobody really would care --

MR. NOTTI: Yeah.

MR. MITCHELL: -- all that much about settling land claims, but -- but nobody really sort of put their foot down. And I was curious as to -- was that discussed at the AFN board level of not trying to stop the pipeline at that point, or why did it go so easily?

MR. NOTTI: You know, I don't remember any part of that. I remember the agreements. I thought it was a mistake then to sign the waivers with just the phone calls and informal discussions. We had to convince some of the people that they shouldn't do it, but they did anyway.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, now did -- did AFN, I know that -- that the Stevens Village lawsuit was filed, I think, like, March of 1970. And Hickel -- and that was to prevent Hickel from actually issuing the right-of-way permit across village lands. But the land freeze -- Hickel had actually modified the land freeze to -- to basically clear off the right-of-way corridor, back, I think, in December of the previous year. And was there ever any discussion on the part of AFN about AFN filing a lawsuit to stop the pipeline? Is that --

MR. NOTTI: No. I don't remember anything special about (indiscernible).

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. And then I think the other thing that we haven't talked about, that's sort of part of -- sort of the Keith Miller component of this, and that is that there appears to be when the committee began marking this stuff up with the royalty and everything else, a major white backlash here at home led by Atwood and -- and those people. And how extensive was it? Was it just Atwood or was it -- was it much more pervasive than that? And was -- how -- how bad was this guy grumbling? Was it ugly? How did the -- the non-Native community feel about all of this?

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MR. NOTTI: Well, they felt a lot of threat, led, of course, by editorials. And the reason that some of them felt threatened -- and I got calls from non-Natives who -- their homesteads, after they proved up on them were not approved. They couldn't get trade manufacturing sites. The pipeline, of course -- a lot of people had money and equipment, expecting to put it to work. All of these things -- there was a -- there was a lot of -- Alaska's a different place, a hotbed of -- a lot of high emotions for and against the -- the settlement.

MR. MITCHELL: Now -- now David Wolf told me that when -- and he was obviously living in Fairbanks at the time, and you were -- you were down here, he told me that actually after the Stevens Village injunction came down, that he actually had his life threatened. And -- and in a "no fooling around" fashion. Did you ever experience that kind of stuff?

MR. NOTTI: There was -- there was a contract out on me.

MR. MITCHELL: Seriously?

MR. NOTTI: Seriously. And I called the attorney general about it and asked him what he knew about it, and he said, "Nothing, but stay by your phone." And head of the state troopers called me and said, "What you've been hearing is true. What you don't know is that we -- we guard your house 24 hours a day. We'll go to work with you, go to school with your kids. We'll -- we follow the busses to school. We follow the busses home and make sure the kids get in the house, they're at the house every day. We go to lunch with you." And they -- they knew who -- who the people were. And they even had a state trooper -- even had an insider within the group who -- who was on probation and when then they found out about it, they pulled the person in and said, "You keep us informed or you're going back to jail." So that kind of -- well, that cooled the whole thing. But it -- it was a serious --

MR. MITCHELL: And so then in sort of spring of '70 when --

MR. NOTTI: No. That was later. That was after -- that would have been '72 maybe.

MR. MITCHELL: Over -- over the pipeline.

MR. NOTTI: '72, '73, somewhere in there.

MR. MITCHELL: So yeah. It's -- everyone's so civilized around here these days.

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. (Indiscernible).

MR. MITCHELL: That could be -- well, the -- the committee gets its bill done in April of '70. And I came across some -- some newspaper articles in the Empire that apparently in, I guess, April of 1970, Ramsey Clark came up to Juneau and, I guess, met with the AFN board, I think. I know, he talked to the legislature about -- about the bill and why it was such a great idea. And in terms of what later happened on the Ford, do you recall that -- what Clark's attitude was about

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the Senate Interior committee bill, about you guys really trying to improve it with -- with amendments and that sort of thing?

MR. NOTTI: No. I remember him coming to -- to Juneau and he met up in the -- what's now the Senate Finance room with a group of legislators -- and made the argument that it was necessary and it was a good deal for the State as well as for Native people. But I don't remember his attitude on the bill.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, let me get back to that just -- just for the record.

MR. NOTTI: Sure. The attorney general I called was Avrum Gross and the head of public safety who called me back was Burton, so --

MR. MITCHELL: Okay.

MR. NOTTI: During that era.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. So if people need to -- to run that down -- that would be interesting to know. So no- -- nothing ever -- since nobody actually ever tried to do you any harm, nobody ever got arrested.

MR. NOTTI: Right. So we don't know who those guys were -- we don't know whether --

MR. MITCHELL: CW Snudd (phonetic).

MR. NOTTI: No. No. They -- they knew -- they knew a lot about the inner circle and who it was.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, the reason that I asked about Ramsey Clark is that it was interesting that it appears that Vaness told me that -- that after the bill was -- was put together, that he recalls -- I don't know whether you were with him or not -- Native leaders coming in to meet with -- with him and Scoop about trying to improve the bill in terms of whether, you know, Jackson would accept this amendment or that amendment. And -- on the floor, when the bill got to the Senate floor, and that Jackson did accept some amendments. He accepted -- apparently there was no guarantee the way that the bill was drafted that you'd even get the amount of takers that the bill said you were entitled to. And there was this amendment to make -- to give out land Arctic Slope in fee, which were the mineral rights up inside that floor. And so long as it was all (indiscernible), and there were some things like that on the margins. But that in terms of the big issues for AFN -- which would have been obviously 40 million acres, and -- and regional corporations versus the statewide corporation, and things like that, that Jackson said, "No. I'm not going to -- I'm not going to agree with amendments like that." And that -- and then the -- Ramsey sort of said, okay, according to Bill Byler, and did not intend to run amendments on the floor against Jackson. And that it -- it's Byler's -- Bill Byler's recollection that he heard about this and that he had gone to Kennedy and Fred Harris and had said this was sort of wrong. And that he had to do something about the 40 million acres and that he bumped into you and Borbridge on the street about the time of the -- of the Senate floor action and mentioned all this. And that's sort

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of how that 40 million acre amendment got started, but it did not come through Ramsey Clark. Do you -- do you remember that at all in terms of --

MR. NOTTI: No, I don't. Once it got in the bill, though, it was Don Wright and Laura Bergt who got the administration to accept that -- and maybe you're going to get to that.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. I'm going to -- I'm going to get to that. I'm just trying to --

MR. NOTTI: I can't recall that, specifically -- Byler's role in it.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. And you don't recall Ramsey's, sort of, attitude about -- about all that -- okay. Were you back for the Senate floor in Washington?

MR. NOTTI: No. Right at the end there I wasn't there.

MR. MITCHELL: I mean for '70, not for '71.

MR. NOTTI: You know, I can't remember now.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, the next thing that happens, of course, is -- well, is that the bill does actually get off the Senate floor in 1970 fairly easily. But, you know, Jackson has it all greased, and I guess Stevens kept the -- the Allotts under control. And -- and the whole thing moves over to the House and there was -- obviously, at that point it runs into the dead end of Wayne Aspinall and Jim Hale. Were you involved in -- in -- in the late summer of '70 in lobbying the House and trying to get Aspinall to -- to do something? What were your impressions of Aspinall?

MR. NOTTI: I had dinner with Aspinall, and I lobbied daily from Florida --

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Right.

MR. NOTTI: -- and Aspinall wouldn't budge. He was -- he is was an old Indian fighter I think for Colorado. Well, he really didn't believe in a lot of this stuff. So he was -- he was a crotchety old guy. He didn't mince words with you. If he disagreed with you, he told you. So we didn't make much headway with him. It was only after -- it was after some of those people changed in the House.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. It was in '71.

MR. NOTTI: Yeah.

MR. MITCHELL: When Begich got --

MR. NOTTI: Right.

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MR. MITCHELL: -- but this was -- I know that in -- in '70 that's when -- when Howard Pollock was still there. What -- what about Pollock? What was your impression? Was he helpful? Was he ineffectual?

MR. NOTTI: Howard was hard to deal with because he wouldn't really tell you where he stood. But I think he'd oppose us. He didn't believe in the land freeze I don't think. We had a hard time getting a promise out of him to hold the land freeze, but I don't think he -- he really believed in -- in the things that he told us. Grudgingly told us, I might say.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, the -- the other group that we haven't talked about is -- is the oil industry. And -- and one of the reasons I asked about Aspinall was that there was an effort to get Aspinall to move that bill prior to the August recess in 1970, and he didn't do it. And then by that time TAPS had reorganized itself into Alyeska. Sort of as his first official act -- I don't know if you were in town for this, but Ed Patton came up to the Anchorage Chambers of Commerce and said in his speech -- he said, "Oh, by the way, I'd like you to know that there's not going to be a pipeline until we settle Native land claims." At which point the Chambers of Commerce and all these people go, "Oh, we didn't understand that." And they all went, according to the press account, sort of crazy, sort of trying to figure out how to get Aspinall to move the bill. And they were going to send a delegation back, and they had Stevens and Gravel over there. And, I mean, it was -- apparently it was really quite funny to see this light bulb going off in their head, you know. Only -- you know, you couldn't tell them this, but Ed -- once Ed Patton told them there wasn't going to be a pipeline, then all of a sudden they got -- they understood. It would have been a riot (indiscernible). And so I guess that whole -- they obviously were very active the next year, in 1971. But -- but when TAPS was still around, were they active in Washington, D.C.? Did you see them during, like, the Senate markups or any of that sort of stuff?

MR. NOTTI: No. We were always a little bit paranoid about influencing the outcome. And we always watched for any activity or just from questioning, to see if any of the lobbyists had been around, what they might be saying, who they were talking to and what, but we never really crossed their trail anywhere. And the only thing I can think is that they did want to get their pipeline started. And I suspect their -- I always suspected that their position was, "We don't care what the terms of the settlement are, just solve it." And -- but they took that stand, and when they were ready to bill it, I think they did influence the movement, but not the terms.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. But you didn't -- you weren't in daily communication with -- with their lobbyists?

MR. NOTTI: No.

MR. MITCHELL: I know Hugh Gallagher was on the scene at that point --

MR. NOTTI: Yeah.

MR. MITCHELL: -- and people like that. Well --

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MR. NOTTI: We did talk to AFL-CIO and -- and who endorsed us. National Consulate of Churches endorsed us. I went to Detroit to their convention, talked to 10,000 delegates, the biggest crowd I ever talked to, and they endorsed us a hundr- -- unanimously. And we had private Natives with AFL-CIO officials in D.C., and they finally endorsed us.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, one of the -- one of the things that begins to change the whole scene are the 1970 elections. And one of the things that I had sort of forgotten about, I'm embarrassed to say, was that while all this is going on in 1970, you had run in the primary for Secretary of State.

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. I forget about that.

MR. MITCHELL: And -- and I think that before that you had been on the Anchorage School Board, right?

MR. NOTTI: Uh-huh.

MR. MITCHELL: When -- when did you --

MR. NOTTI: '69.

MR. MITCHELL: '69.

MR. NOTTI: It was on unfinished terms. Someone quit and I was there for one year, and I had enough of that. One year was enough.

MR. MITCHELL: Yeah, well, you can see what's happening today with the school board.

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. Hasn't changed much.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, then in terms of the -- of -- of your 1970 race, did -- I guess you lost by about 8,000 votes, I think, to Boucher (phonetic) or something like that. Eight or 9,000. Did -- what kind of a campaign were you able to run? Did you --

MR. NOTTI: It was very a low-key campaign. I think there were three of us. Chuck -- anyway, there -- there were three of us in the race. I was a -- I spent 50 cents a vote and I think Ray Boucher spent \$5.50 a vote then. That was afterward, so it was a matter of money.

MR. MITCHELL: Did you get out and travel statewide, or you didn't have the money to do that?

MR. NOTTI: I didn't have the money to do it.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, the -- the -- couple interesting things happen in that -- that 1970 election. In addition to you, is -- and that is -- first of all, Stevens is -- is elected finally in his own right. And -- and to what extent prior to that election -- do you think that that election

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helped -- what is the right way to say this? It would seem to me that -- that all through 1969 and 1970 that Stevens would have sort of been a trapped laboratory rat and that on the one hand he had seen that you guys had really elected Mike Gravel. So he knew what the -- the power of the push vote. You know, he was focused. And on the other hand, he naturally -- his natural constituency were sort of the Anchorage, Fairbanks Chambers of Commerce. And you guys obviously both wanted completely different things with respect to land claims. And did you see that kind of tension in '69 and '70, and did that change once Stevens was elected in his own right? Or was Stevens pretty much consistent all the way through?

MR. NOTTI: Stevens was pretty consistent, but I think he started to form alliances with people who became his friends in the Native community at that point. So he started -- started giving us more and more support, looking at elections in his own right. So I think it softened him a little bit.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, now, the other thing is, did -- obviously most of you guys were Democrats --

MR. NOTTI: Right.

MR. MITCHELL: -- and -- and obviously Willie was running for the Senate in 1970. You had been politically active running for statewide office. You and Don Wright, who we'll talk about in a second, was running for the State senator in Anchorage. And there was an amazing amount of political activity from -- from people in the Native leadership. And -- did you guys -- what did you do about Ste- -- Stev- -- did you guys actively work for Wendell Kay the way you worked for Gravel, or did you guys sit that one out? Or did people actively support Stevens? Or how did -- I haven't cracked the numbers yet to look at the elections.

MR. NOTTI: Yeah, I don't -- I think we kind of sat it out. I don't remember anybody really taking any stand on that race.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, then how about -- how about Miller Egan? I know that they had split -- I mean, Egan -- I had been through the -- the press clips that -- that Egan was really quite adamant that, "Yes. The State should participate." He didn't -- he wouldn't tell you how many acres he supported, but the idea that the State didn't -- shouldn't participate in this thing, and that he said the acres were negotiable during the campaign -- and did you guys -- what did you do about Egan Miller? Did you also sit that out, or was --

MR. NOTTI: No. I think it was strong, individual support. I don't think AFN took a stand. But, individually, most people were for Egan -- probably Egan. I remember first Eben Hopson took Egan on and then switched to help him and he ended up his special assistant.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Yeah, the -- just to set the mood, which I think was a good move. I mean, the day he was sworn in was when he publicly announced he was hiring Eben and Byron. Which in terms of, obviously, sending a good signal to you guys, I would assume. Did you guys know that was coming? Did --

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MR. NOTTI: No. Not the appointments, but both Eben and Byron were close to them. Eben because he'd been around them, and the legislature knew Egan well, and Byron, because they were -- for some reason Egan kind of adopted Yakutat, and Byron was a young mayor and -- and they liked each other and got along well.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, then -- then, of course, the last guy who -- who used to be, I think, critically important is Nick Begich.

MR. NOTTI: Right.

MR. MITCHELL: And what was your impressions of Nick? And what, if anything, did you guys do for him in this campaign?

MR. NOTTI: Well, again, the AFN was -- we weren't all Democrats, so we had dissension. So we really didn't -- I don't remember us ever endorsing. But I personally got involved with Nick Begich and supported him strongly. And -- and where -- where Nick won at AFN against Howard Pollock, was his stand on -- on the land freeze. There was a meeting in Fairbanks in October, and we had about 800 people in the audience. And I asked all of the candidates what their stand was on the land freeze: Mike Gravel, Paul, and Begich. And they all gave support, but it took -- it took me three times to get Pollock to take a stand on it. And he -- he gave a long, involved answer and, you know, gave a lukewarm support. And when they -- Begich got to the microphone, I asked him, "What's your stand on the land freeze?" He spread his legs and put his fists in the air and said, "I'll hold the land freeze until hell freezes over." And there was pandemonium in the -- the audience. There was foot stomping and whistling. And he really brought the crowd on his side by this, you know, unequivocal stand. He didn't waste words or anything. He just came right to the point and said he would support it. And so Nick got a little strong Bush support.

MR. MITCHELL: So that would have been the '68 convention, because he -- he did work at this --

MR. NOTTI: He did.

MR. MITCHELL: -- for a couple cycles.

MR. NOTTI: Yeah.

MR. MITCHELL: I mean, it looks like he really put together a statewide organization so it wouldn't have been -- because Pollock, obviously, had -- had stepped aside by '70, because he had gone off to run for governor.

MR. NOTTI: Right.

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MR. MITCHELL: So -- but -- so then Nick's sort of affiliation with the Native community then would have started back then --

MR. NOTTI: Right.

MR. MITCHELL: -- that (indiscernible). Well --

MR. NOTTI: Let's -- let's take a break.

MR. MITCHELL: Sure. (Brief break.)

MR. MITCHELL: We were just talking about the -- the 1970 election, which -- which occurred in -- in November of which -- of 1970, which obviously brought into 1971 a whole new lineup in terms of Egan and Begich that proved quite important. But we haven't talked about the Native leadership. And I guess the first question about that is that -- that you had been AFN president since -- since the spring of 1967 when -- when AFN had been organized. And you had decided that the October 1970 convention -- not to run for reelection for another term. Why was that?

MR. NOTTI: My thinking was I'd taken the organization and the effort as far as I could. Every organization picks up its strengths and weaknesses of the person heading it up. And I thought it needed new energy because I was pretty burned out. And there were some areas that I thought maybe could use some -- a different source. So I stepped aside. I thought -- my expectations was that Willie was going to get the presidency.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, that's -- actually was going to be my next question, of course. Well, obviously that's not what happened.

MR. NOTTI: Right. I know how it happened.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Well, I was -- you know, before I -- before I get to -- to that, the guy that was elected was Don Wright. And Don had obviously -- I mean, to say that Don has been a controversial member of the Native community would be -- would be putting it somewhat mildly.

MR. NOTTI: Right.

MR. MITCHELL: And obviously he had been involved with CINA, I think, sort of at the beginning. And as I understand it, he had taken over being president from CINA when Egan left the presidency of that organization to go take on AFN.

MR. NOTTI: I helped him get into it.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, I was going to say, how did Don get involved in all of this, and what was his involvement in the CINA?

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MR. NOTTI: Don moved to Anchorage from Fairbanks and got involved in CINA. And there -- I -- I wrote into the bylaws of CINA, "two-term limit" because I thought it was good -- good training ground. We needed to get the Native people up to speed and on their feet and familiar with parliamentary procedure and talking to audiences and whatnot. So I thought a good way to do that was -- it was good training ground. So I wrote in a two-term limit. And then Don became the president, and as president of CINA, he took stands many times that were different from AFN. Even when I asked him not to, for instance, endorse candidates, but he -- he did. He did his own thinking, so -- but I helped him get into CINA. And CINA was the organization that called the first statewide meeting.

MR. MITCHELL: Right.

MR. NOTTI: So he was right in the center of it being here, and he was active with all the lawyers. So it was -- it was a natural step for him to try and get into AFN. I didn't think he would make it because he was controversial.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, now, if he had been sort of a -- after the president, you had, like, first vice presidents and second vice presidents of the AFN.

MR. NOTTI: Right.

MR. MITCHELL: And he had been a -- a vice president of AFN at some time in the past. I can't --

MR. NOTTI: In -- in the beginning he was the first vice president. First organized meeting he was vice president. Subsequently when we had elections, it was Willie Hensley and John Borbridge, first and second vice president, so --

MR. MITCHELL: Well -- and actually maybe that's a question I -- I don't know the answer to. And that is, I know that at that -- at that spring of '67 organizing meeting that it looks like everybody who should have showed up to be on the AFN board got together and sort of picked you to be the president and Willie -- or, I mean, and Borbridge to be a vice president and other people to be different officers. When did -- when did AFN really start electing you guys? Did -- when was the first time that -- that you had to run to be AFN president?

MR. NOTTI: Probably the next October right after that. So, like, October '67. Yeah -- you probably know the sequence, but it was -- they had talked about it before. Three years ago.

MR. MITCHELL: Right.

MR. NOTTI: But in '66 we sent out a committee to write bylaws. Flore Lekanof chaired that committee. In January of '67 we met in Fairbanks and we had to go around with the attorney general, Donald Burn.

MR. MITCHELL: Right.

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MR. NOTTI: And we failed to adopt bylaws. And we had another meeting in April of '67, where we adopted bylaws and elected the first officers to carry to the first convention in sixty- -- '66. The first AFN convention. The first -- '66 was the first statewide meeting.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Right. So then -- so it was really then since '67 you had been running --

MR. NOTTI: Right.

MR. MITCHELL: -- for the job. Well, okay. Now we are to -- to how it is that Don got elected. Obviously, what I know from the Tundra Times, of course, is that you had decided not to run and that the three candidates were Don and Willie and Borbridge. How did -- how did all that happen?

MR. NOTTI: We had a meeting. It -- the meeting was here in Anchorage at the Carpenter's Hall. John (indiscernible) parliamentarian. And the -- the reason Don got elected was that he got the -- he got groups to support him. I think a senator from Bethel.

MR. MITCHELL: Ray Christiansen.

MR. NOTTI: Ray Christiansen got the Bethel delegation to go for -- for Don, and that was just what he needed to put him over. I think it was two ballots.

MR. MITCHELL: Right.

MR. NOTTI: Second ballot was Willie and Don. And it was a Bethel delegation that put Don across, which kind of surprised me, but they had discipline. Mainly because of Ray.

MR. MITCHELL: Now, do you know why they would have been attracted -- or actually, I mean, obviously he had, in addition to Bethel, that might have been the margin (indiscernible). I assume had Tanana Chiefs with him, I think, didn't he?

MR. NOTTI: You know, I don't remember. Not totally. They split. Most of them split.

MR. MITCHELL: The delegate -- the individual delegation split?

MR. NOTTI: Yeah.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, why -- why were people attracted to Don's candidacy, do you think, as opposed to Willie and Borbridge? What was it that Don -- you know, was it totally just a personality thing, or did he have a different view of where the Land Claim Act was going, or --

MR. NOTTI: No. I think he was in agreement most -- with most of what we did. I mean, he -- as far as the issues were, he -- he disagreed with how we approached them. We weren't bombastic about that. He -- he was always outspoken and controversial and disagreeable in the meetings

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sometimes. But he worked closely with the lawyers and I think it would be a -- some of the people just -- most of the people just liked his approach.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, the other thing with that is that he seems to be of -- of sort of that circle of AFN leadership. The most that was -- the most active with -- with NCAI and the outside Indian groups, was that perception on my part correct? Were there other views that were as active as Don, or was he really the link that -- to those other people?

MR. NOTTI: We all had our ties, but you are correct in that he was more active. He -- he was NCAI area vice president.

MR. MITCHELL: Right.

MR. NOTTI: And he really wanted it, worked at it at, organized the people to go down there and elect him. And -- and he was active with outside groups. He was responsible for AFN getting \$250,000 loan from Yakamas.

MR. MITCHELL: I was going to ask you about that, as to whether that was his link.

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. It was his -- his friendship with Bob Jim, who was chairman of the Yakamas at the time.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, that actually -- before we move on, that's another time, I guess, to stop and talk about the money. Obviously it -- going into it the Tyoneks had come up with this \$100,000 loan that would have gotten you guys going. And the Yakama loan I think was -- was late summer of '70. What kind of shape was AFN in financially all through your tenure, and did that make a difference in the kind of lobby you guys were able to put together?

MR. NOTTI: It did make a difference. It wasn't the Tyonek loan that got them going, it was my sacrifices. Because I took on AFN because it was an issue that I thought needed resolution. And I took it on when AFN had \$9 in the bank. I got three months behind on the house payment. I got three months behind on the car payment. We ate pretty sparsely at home for -- for quite awhile. And then we got a \$100,000 loan about a year into -- we got \$100,000 loan from Tyoneks. Up until then we -- we did a couple things. We asked people -- we solicited \$1 and \$2 donations from around the state from people. \$10 donations. That's what kept us going initially. Then we tried to assess the nonprofits, and they were having problems with the loans, so they didn't all pay their assessments. CINA carried some of the burden, because I remember one meeting -- going back to D.C. we called a Sunday meeting in -- in Anchorage here to raise \$1,100. Willie and I went back to a meeting with Udall and Governor Hickel. On Hickel's first approach to -- we talked about land claims in Bartlett's office. And I called Bartlett and asked him if the -- what I heard was right, there's a meeting. And he said, "Yeah, come on back. When you get there, just walk in." So -- because I -- I got along well with Bartlett and really liked him, so he was real good to us. And so AFN -- it did affect our lobby because it was real tough just to get a bill to go back with.

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MR. MITCHELL: Well, I know that -- I've seen from the Tundra Times that you were supposed to, at least by the end, be getting paid like 20 grand a year or something. Did you ever see any of that kind of money?

MR. NOTTI: No. I was never authorized to get 20 grand. I was -- I remember the first resolution was I could pay myself 1,000 a month if I could raise it. That -- those were the words of (indiscernible) from FNA. And then towards the end it went to 18,000 when I left.

MR. MITCHELL: And that was actually because of the Yakama thing.

MR. NOTTI: Yeah.

MR. MITCHELL: There was actually some money there.

MR. NOTTI: Right.

MR. MITCHELL: Also, I never have asked -- I know you have a new family now in terms of trying to do this -- this thing from scratch in '66, '67, '68. How many -- did you have kids in those days that were pretty young, didn't you? How --

MR. NOTTI: I had three. It was pretty tough. They were all young. I took them back to D.C. with me for that three-month period and left them alone a lot. And yeah.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, now --

MR. NOTTI: AFN was pretty boring.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, one of the reasons I asked about the money -- and this is actually sort of getting to some of the questions that I wanted to ask at the end, but this is a good spot to do it, and that is that -- that as you know, there's been, the last 10 years or so, a lot of criticism in the -- the Native community sort of coming out of the villages about how well we -- we didn't really know what was going on. We were never consulted. You know, we -- nobody ever gave us, you know, a copy of SAT30 versus a copy of US35. And, I mean, you know, you -- you get the blunt of a lot of that. One of the things that has crossed my mind thinking about it is that obviously in those days not only were there no telephones really in the villages but -- but there wasn't any electricity in many. Certainly there's no -- no KYUK radio and TV. I mean, none of that kind of stuff.

MR. NOTTI: That's true.

MR. MITCHELL: What was the level of -- of the ability to communicate sort of with the -- I mean, were the -- were the leaders sort of out there on their own as a matter of necessity, or was there more communication than people now say?

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MR. NOTTI: Well, as much as we could do with -- got to remember, it was just me and a -- and a part-time secretary. And you're correct, there were no telephones. There was no radio station in Bethel or Galena or Kotzebue. I think there was one in Nome. So when we called the first meeting, I expected about 14 people because those were the people that we knew and that's the organizations that existed. Our efforts included letters to those people and sometimes to villages, to the non-profits. And then I wrote something called Federations Footnotes that I tried to submit a weekly little box of information on what AFN was doing.

MR. MITCHELL: Did that go to the Tundra Times?

MR. NOTTI: Tundra Times, yeah. And then we -- we got a hold of Ruben Gaines, who was a well-known voice in Alaska, and would submit weekly reports to him. And he would put them in his style of what we were doing, and then we aired those at as many places that would take them for free. We sent these tapes around to Fairbanks, Nome, Cordova, Anchorage, and Southeast. And how many of them aired, I don't know, but I know that that was aired. So we made every effort that we could. Besides, when we got the \$100,000 loan, we -- we chartered DC-3s and small airplanes to get people to Fairbanks. And one reason was when we would get before Congress they would say, "Well, who do you represent, and how did they get elected?" And my answer would be, "Well, we -- at the last convention -- we had 800 people from around the state, and it included people from every village -- most every village." And so we tried to get as many people in as we could. And hopefully, when they run it back, they talked about what went wrong, but obviously that wasn't the case. So with -- with the resources we had, we knew we were -- we were -- our communications was inadequate, but with the manpower we had -- we had just assumed that our back was protected and faced the outside world with Congress and the State and (indiscernible) to keep the thing moving, because I think we hit a window of time and opportunity that -- that was unique and would not be repeated again. I think --

MR. MITCHELL: Did you know that at the time?

MR. NOTTI: I felt that at the time. Ten -- ten years earlier if the government would have said, "Here's \$50 million," we probably would have accepted it. And 10 years later because of the oil, we could never have gotten 40 million acres. So I think we maximized time and money and land in that little window. So the criticism is probably valid in that there wasn't enough information. But at the same time, it's not completely valid, because we did get people in from all over the state.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Did -- I guess the next thing is, obviously, Don Wright takes over of -- and he immediately gets Adrian Parmeter involved. And, you know, there's lots of things going on in terms of the White House and Lloyd Berg (phonetic), and all of that stuff. And after you left the presidency how -- how much of that were you personally involved in? Do -- I don't know -- did go -- you'd been working for the Human Rights Commission or something before you had been AFN president?

MR. NOTTI: Yeah.

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MR. MITCHELL: What did you do? Did you go back to a regular full-time job, or how did that -

MR. NOTTI: No. I -- I went back to my first training. That's in elections. I opened a sales and repair shop in Sitka.

MR. MITCHELL: Oh. So you moved back to Sitka?

MR. NOTTI: I did. I moved back to Sitka.

MR. MITCHELL: Then were you -- how much were you involved in '71? Were you pretty much out of it?

MR. NOTTI: Yeah, I was pretty much -- I just -- I stayed away from it. I didn't want to be part of the problem. Don -- Don took over. He should have his -- because, obviously, I still had a lot of support. And -- but I didn't want to, you know, (indiscernible) program was.

MR. MITCHELL: And did -- did you stay in the AFN board then, or --

MR. NOTTI: No, I was out.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, one of the other things, sort of the beginning to the end, was that if there was any theme that -- that comes across as -- I was rereading last night your 1969 testimony -- the first time Arthur Goldberg shows up. And on your list of -- of sort of nonnegotiable demands from the Native community, one of them is that, you know, however the settlement turns out, you know, we want a settlement that will allow us to run our own affairs. That is the bottom line sort of deal buster here. And -- and it has been amazing to me, that -- that that's obviously what Congress eventually agreed to. But at the same time that Congress did that in 1971, and in 1969 and 1970, I don't know if you remember John Borbridge was trying to finally get Congress to pass the legislation to -- to give the Tlingit-Haida Central Council the money that they'd been trying to get for 85 years. And that went to conference in '71. And I don't know if you remember all of this, but Gravel had changed the -- the bill for the Tlingit-Haida settlement to do exactly that. Which was to say that, you know, Central Counsel just gets the money like any other people, and they can do what they want. And Aspinall and these people said, you know, "Over our goddamn dead bodies are you going to do that. You know, I've been the chairman of this committee for 20 years and we've never had an Indian judgment where people didn't have to come to the Secretary of the Interior and show that they weren't going to waste the money, and I'm not going to start this precedent now," and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. And they had this big -- this big bloodletting in the spring of 1970 and Aspinall went. You know, that -- that, you know, Tlingit-Haida people had to just like every other Indian tribe had to go, you know, put up with all these BI bureaucrats. And then nevertheless, that's for a -- an insignificant -- as you look back on it, 7.5 million. And a year later the Congress puts almost \$1 billion on the street with no strings whatsoever attached. And in exactly the way that you had really demanded when -- when -- at the beginning of this. How did that happen? I mean, do you have any light to shed on how

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that sort of attitude by Congress got reversed so quickly? It seems to me a major part of the settlement.

MR. NOTTI: Because Aspinall wasn't there. But that -- you're right. That was our position all along because we used to say that a lot of examples of failure around the country -- and the organization with its finger in the pile of, and that was the BIA. And we didn't want them making no decisions for us. We could do it ourselves. If we're going to fail, we're going to fail on our own without government help.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, that sort of leads me into my -- my next to last question. And that is that -- is that's a great idea and concept. And when I talked to Bill Vaness about it, I asked him exactly the question I just asked you, is how on Earth did they just hang this completely turn? And he said among other things, that in addition to just sort of the -- how the times were changing, you know, Indian self-determination, Alcatraz, all that stuff was going on, but that he said it was also -- he says, you know, "What are we going to do when guys, like, mention -- you know, guys like Emil Notti and John Borbridge and Will Hensley come in front of the committee and say, 'Look, we're normal citizens. Why can't we -- we're obviously capable of learning our own affairs like everybody else. Why are you treating us like -- like wards?' What are we going to say, you know?" And my response to that is, "Well, that's great, but if you look at the way the claims act was set up with 200 village corporations and 12 regions, divided all over the state -- that if you did just the basic math, you know, of, like, a board -- a village board of directors with, like, 10 people on -- on the board -- but if you did the math, what you were presupposing is a policy judgment is that there were, like, 3,000 Emil Nottis and Willie Hensleys. And not only were the 3,000 of them, but they weren't all just living in Anchorage. They were living in Noatak and Chefnak, Kake. And we all know that that was not, you know, the -- the situation. And -- and I guess I'm -- that's a long-winded way of asking the question of did -- did you guys think about those kinds of things at the time, or were events just moving so fast that people didn't think about it? Or -- or how did people inside the Native community (indiscernible) that there might be manpower staffing problems?

MR. NOTTI: Well, I don't think we really addressed that issue. But we must have been aware of it a little bit because the first bill was for one statewide organization to provide technical backup, legal advice, economic advice, business advice, which would have been much more efficient. Ninety-five percent of the money would have gone to the villages, and the land was all in the villages. So -- but when -- when it turned out to be 200 village corporations, I always thought Stevens was behind it. And my personal feeling was that it was designed for failure. That may be unfair, but I -- that just was my -- my thought. But we never really fought it or discussed it.

MR. MITCHELL: And this is the village corporation?

MR. NOTTI: Village corporations.

MR. MITCHELL: When you say, "designed for failure," do you think that -- that there were people that -- that sort of did that on purpose? Or do you think it was just designed in terms of when you look at the structure of what respectively -- well, obviously wasn't going to work?

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MR. NOTTI: Oh, I think it was just by accident, the self-determination unit and whatnot. In the long run who knows. I consider this whole thing a social experiment in many ways. And in the long run it may be the best approach.

MR. MITCHELL: Well -- and actually, I did think of one other question before I get to my last question. And that is that one guy we haven't talked about through this whole thing -- that's in his own way is as legendary as Don Wright, if not more so, was -- is Charlie. And, you know, I sort of talked to Charlie. I know Charlie's opinion of Charlie's contributions through all this. What's -- how did Charlie fit into everything that was going on in Washington? Was he helpful, unhelpful? Did he -- did he have influence in this process either within AFN or with the committees, or --

MR. NOTTI: Basically, Charlie had a lot of influence. Charlie is Charlie. You know, he -- he came up with money and travel, and traveled first class many times and stayed in the best hotels. And he was helpful because, tongue in cheek, he used to say, "Hey, if you don't deal with us who are more moderate then we get replaced -- you're going to deal with -- with Charlie and his supporters. Who are you going to listen to? You have to give us something or otherwise, if we come home empty-handed, we'll be dealing with a much more militant organization."

MR. MITCHELL: Were those kinds of arguments you could make to Stevens and Gravel and people like that?

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. And I think it was true. If -- if our approach to testifying and up marching like Charlie marched downtown in Anchorage, and the \$900 million on the first lease sale, and he was an activist, the mold of marching and things like that, that if we ended up empty-handed he would say, "Well, see, that's a form of failure. You've got to really assert our rights more forcefully." And I think he would have won. The times were such that emotions were running high, and I didn't think it was empty. I don't want to say threat -- voicing them might have happened.

MR. MITCHELL: And so in other words, it was sort of a helpful --

MR. NOTTI: Yeah.

MR. MITCHELL: -- explaining to the process how reasonable you guys were.

MR. NOTTI: Yeah.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, then actually my -- my last question, which -- which is sort of beyond what I'm trying to do, but I think in terms of people listening to this tape years from now for the purposes I think we -- I've been asking everybody who was a major participant, and that is that it's -- it's always easy to do with the -- the benefit of hindsight and Monday morning quarter back. But sort of in a general way looking back on it now for 20 years, how do you think all this unbalance has turned out? Both good and bad. And if you could do it over again in terms

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of setting up a different kind of settlement, either both in terms of the amount of land and money or the structure, looking back on it how -- how would you do that?

MR. NOTTI: Well, I think the structure is probably all right. I -- I think the money settlement was short. And where we made the loss or where we got the big loss was the 2 percent in perpetuity which would have amounted by today several billion dollars, that would have been in the corporations and into village corporations. But that was handed to us. That was not negotiated. Our stand was 2 percent in perpetuity. And Congress in their arguments said they would not approve open-ended --

MR. MITCHELL: This is tape two of an interview with Emil Notti on November 30, 1992. And we were just talking about --

MR. NOTTI: October 30th.

MR. MITCHELL: Oh, I'm sorry. Did I say November? October 30, 1992. Tape two of two tapes. And on tape one we had just been discussing how much Emil Notti had thought all this had turned out and unbalance and what, if anything, you would do differently if he was starting from scratch. And we were just talking about the fact that Congress had -- had altered the AFN position of the two percent royalty and perpetuity, and had put a -- a -- basically a limit on -- on the amount of money. And so --

MR. NOTTI: That -- that was the big -- big loss in the -- in our efforts. And with -- if we had gotten that it would have made a big difference in terms of the money. The land I think was probably as good as we could have done. We started at 80 million acres and compromised down to 40 with promise of State support, and we ended up with forty- -- 44 million. So I wouldn't have changed it. And as far as measuring how successful they are, maybe someone can do some guesstimating as to how successful it is, someone in social sciences. But I think prior to, you know, prior to land claims, we used to say we're jerking people out of leap frogging three generations to pull people from a subsistence lifestyle into the western economy. And we're trying to do it in one generation. Most of us didn't know what a corporation was. And so now just overnight we're -- we're dealing with corporations and reporting annual reports on SEC formats. We're using cumulative holding, we're electing boards of directors, and dealing with a lot of corporate law and negotiating with oil companies, doing contracts, and doing all these things. And the -- the advancement from subsistence -- total subsistence lifestyle to getting people in the corporate world, I think, is something you may never measure, but I think it -- it's been fairly successful. So I wouldn't have changed it. Are you done with questions? I got a couple of things I want to --

MR. MITCHELL: Oh, sure. Go ahead. I had -- I had one that I thought up while you were saying, but why don't you go --

MR. NOTTI: No, go ahead.

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MR. MITCHELL: No. Once you -- well, all right. I'll -- okay. Well, the last one of that that I think sort of is -- is related but not totally, is that I have gone through this project. I've tried to just sort of place the Alaska Native experience in sort of a context in my own line of what was going on with the Native Americans in the United States, in terms of how they had -- had been dealt with and how they sort of saw their situation. And one of the amazing things it seems to -- to differentiate the -- the Alaska experience, is -- is the Alaska Natives involvement from a very early time in sort of the state and political structure, you know, beginning with Bill Paul in the '20s and, you know, Andrew Hope and the -- the private issues and all that. But -- but when you -- when you get into this modern era, you know, the -- well, I'm going to -- we're going to protect Alaska Natives, how do we do that? You know, Willie Hensley run -- way to do that. Willie Hensley runs for a legislature. John Sackett runs for the legislature. You run for statewide office. Don Wright runs for -- for (indiscernible) and I've actually been in contact with -- I got so curious I wrote to, like, the head of the political science department so, like, the University of Arizona, which has obviously a big Indian population and also South Dakota. And they both wrote back and said, you know, "We've done very little research on -- on that, but what we can tell you is that there has historically always been hardly any until very, very recently any real involvement by -- by the indigenous populations of our states and the state political structure." And when you look back on the ability of you guys influencing Egan and -- into the, you know, the control you exercised over to Stevens and Gravel was controlled by voting, you know? And it seems that that's sort of a completely different sort of philosophy or point of view of what your situation is from other Native American groups. So I guess my question is, I'm not sure if it's a question, but I guess it's -- do you think my perception in that regard is correct? And if so, what do you think accounts for that sort of different attitude in the part of you guys as opposed to other groups?

MR. NOTTI: I think back in the '20s and '30s it was a conscious effort on the part of ANB to be politically accurate. And I'm told that they say you're a Democrat and you're a Republican because we need people in both camps. And they became expert parliamentarians, because they -- they wanted to adapt to the system, and if they did that, they decided to become experts, which they were and still are. I think we -- we kind of -- we respected their abilities in parliamentary procedure and we -- we didn't divide up into Democrat and Republican, but we did encourage people to run. Like Sackett and Hensley and others. And we knew that -- well, Willie was very aware of it going into -- into Juneau. He -- he was on a mission. He -- he stood up on the floor of the Senate and said that if the State of Alaska legislature can't support land claims, he was going to resign in protest. And so it was all part of, I think, of a pattern of finding influence. What we thought -- we did everything we thought we had to do.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, you had mentioned you had a couple of things.

MR. NOTTI: A couple things just on the -- a side note on the Sealaska Tlingit-Haida, we had a big debate within AFN whether we were going to allow Southeast to join us. The argument against it was that they would weaken our case because they already have a settlement. And -- and if we bring them in, it would be less need to set (indiscernible) because Congress will feel that they've settled the question. So it went to vote -- it was a tie vote. I cast the tie-breaking vote to allow to Tlingit and Haida to join our efforts and Sealaska. More than that, we were told by

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the head of the forest department, Mr. Johnson, years ago in Southeast, Alaska, that if we wouldn't have allowed Southeast in and tried to get land out of the forest, he would guarantee that our bill would die. Not because of his efforts, but because he warned us how strong the environmental people were (indiscernible) would oppose us. But we went ahead anyway. And we were facing so much opposition that another warning wasn't -- didn't influence us.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, now what made you cast your ballot the way that you did? What was your thinking and why was it that way?

MR. NOTTI: Well, my thinking was they did have a settlement, but it wasn't fair. And if it wasn't fair -- if we were going to band together, we had to stick together all the way. So I cast the vote to let them in, which was -- they went from a \$7 million corporation to being capitalized at about \$75 million. So they benefitted greatly besides getting the land.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, now, the other thing about that is I had heard that story from others, but I had never been able to find any AFN board meetings as to when that would have been in the process. Do you --

MR. NOTTI: Well, it would have been just prior to Goldberg coming on board.

MR. MITCHELL: So it would have been in '68?

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. (Indiscernible) if I remember.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Was there -- I mean, obviously it was a tie vote, which means there was some deep conflict in -- inside AFN as to whether this was the right thing to do. I -- I assume without knowing that it was sort of the Arctic Slope kind of people that thought that it wasn't a good idea, or do you remember how that -- what the different arguments were?

MR. NOTTI: No, I -- I don't. And I don't remember specifically, but I think Don Wright led the opposition. Willie Hensley led the poll and then the lawyers joined. Just kind of -- kind of exciting.

MR. MITCHELL: I'll bet.

MR. NOTTI: The other one was another little side note, and it was the Hickel confirmation hearings. Let's take a break.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. (Brief break.)

MR. NOTTI: Hickel confirmation.

MR. MITCHELL: Hickel confirmation, right.

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MR. NOTTI: In December of '68, about 5:00 or 4:45, Cliff Groh called me and said, "Secretary of Interior wants to talk to us at his house." And I -- I said, "Well, I don't know where he lives. Why don't you come by and pick me." And -- and I caught on right away because the rumors were on that Hickel was going to be Secretary of Interior. So he came by and picked me up and we went out to Hickel's home. And when we walked in, Bob Zelnick and Larry Fanning were sitting with Hickel.

MR. MITCHELL: Who were, for the tape, Daily News. I guess Fanning ran the Daily News at the time and Zelnick was a reporter for him.

MR. NOTTI: Yeah. Fanning was the owner or publisher, and Zelnick was his reporter. And they had what would have been tomorrow morning's Drew Pearson column. And in it Drew Pearson said, "Hickel should not be Secretary of Interior because of his stand on the Eskimos out in Bethel selling fish to the Japanese," which was a big fisheries flap. And so when I walked in they were discussing what would have been tomorrow morning's paper, and they wanted me to issue a statement and -- off-setting that. And I said, "Well, I'll be glad to do it," but before I did that, I needed to know something. I said, "First of all, our position has been to hold the land freeze. What would he do as Secretary of Interior?" And he said, "Well, I've thought about that and I've talked to some people. And we're going to look out for your interests. We're not going to allow you to get hurt." And he was going to escrow money and do some things if the land was opened up. And I said, "Well, you know, as governor you opposed the land freeze and you filed a lawsuit against it." And I said, "I would look pretty bad if I endorsed you and then you lifted the land freeze." So I said, "I would need some assurances that -- that you would not lift the land freeze." And again, he said, "Well, I've -- I'll look out for your interest." And he had talked to Joel Fitzgerald who apparently agreed with him from the Federal Field Committee. And he asked me if I knew outside Indians. And I said, "Yeah. We work with NCAI and some other groups." "Well, could get some letters of support form them?" I said, "Yeah, I could, but I really need more assurance than that." And so we left the meeting at that point. Well, our local attorney was real upset with me.

MR. MITCHELL: Cliff Groh.

MR. NOTTI: Cliff Groh. Because he was personal friends of Hickel and he's -- when we left the room he said, "You called Hickel a liar." I said, "No, I didn't." He said, "Yeah." He said, "He promised you he wouldn't hurt you." I said, "But he didn't promise to hold the land freeze." And I said, "I would -- I would look real foolish and wouldn't be doing my job if I agreed to endorse him and he lifted the land freeze, because that's one of -- been one of our major efforts." And -- and I said, "I -- I want him to say it publicly." And he said, "Well, you don't trust him and okay." I said, "Well, if -- if he lifted the land freeze" -- and -- and I said, "Will you promise us not to?" He'd say, "Well, I didn't really promise that." Then -- and what's my word against the governor's word or Secretary of Interior's word. It doesn't mean nothing. I said, "I want it in writing." Because Cliff was close to him and -- but he wouldn't ask him. He wouldn't put it to him. And so Cliff quit AFN over that issue. And Cliff was working real close with Don Wright and he got Don Wright to endorse Hickel. This -- in the Sunday paper I think it was, Don Wright, CINA, endorsed Hickel. AFN -- in the meantime, we'd called a special meeting. I called a special

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meeting. I said, "I will -- I will endorse if the board of directors -- that's a decision for them to make." So we called a special meeting. Unanimously they said, "Go back to D.C. and take some people with you." And they gave me carte blanche. They said: You can endorse, you can withhold endorsement, you can oppose depending on what he does during the hearings. So I picked Willie Hensley, John Borbridge, and Eben Hopson. We flew back to D.C. We were back there for two weeks working the committee. And the day -- about the second day of the hearing -- we'd stand out in the hallway at 7:00 in the morning to get a good seat. About the second day we walked in, the first two rows in the hearing room were -- were lined off. And pretty soon it became apparent why. A whole group of Alaskans walked in. Atwood, Snedin (phonetic), Beau Williams (phonetic), Jesse Carr, couple of Native guys, and people who ordered to send me back there as a matter of fact.

MR. MITCHELL: Oh, I think -- was it Flore and Sackett, are who --

MR. NOTTI: Ray Chris, I think was one of them. And boy, everybody who was who's who in Alaska with influence was sitting in the top two rows. We were in the third row. And then Stevens said, "I would like those outstanding Alaskans who support Hickel's nomination to stand up." So all the first two rows stood up and they'd look back at us and say, "Hey, what the heck is wrong with you guys? How come you're still sitting down?" And we didn't endorse Hickel until end of the third day where he promised to hold the land freeze.

MR. MITCHELL: And now did you talk -- one of the things that I don't think I -- I asked you about this is that during that period of time when you were back there, did you actually meet again with Hickel on this? I mean, Groh was back, I think, attempting to shore Hickel up. Did -- did you attempt to deal with him on this?

MR. NOTTI: I'm trying to remember. I had -- yeah, I did. I had breakfast with him one morning -- 7:00 in the morning. John Borbridge and I -- it didn't work. We had a nice -- very nice breakfast and -- and polite conversation, but he wouldn't promise to do that. And he wouldn't go before the committee and he knew what we wanted and -- but he wouldn't agree to it.

MR. MITCHELL: Well, now how about -- how about -- obviously, the most important guy -- I mean, I've read the hearing record, and guys like me, Lee Metcalf, and the governor and other people, you know, certainly made their use clear, but the guy that really pinned Hickel down on this was Scoop Jackson.

MR. NOTTI: That's right.

MR. MITCHELL: Just would not let him leave the issue.

MR. NOTTI: Wouldn't let him off.

MR. MITCHELL: He pressed him three days in a row.

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MR. NOTTI: Well, two days in a row, and on the third day he said, "Governor, I read the record last night and I'm not sure where we stand on this issue, but before we proceed, I would like an answer. If you are Secretary of the Interior, would you come before this committee before you dispose of any land?" And I thought his nomination was hanging in the balance.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Well, actually that's when I asked Vaness, I said: Well, I didn't -- you know -- now -- Hickel's nomination wasn't really hanging in the balance. He said: Oh, yeah. That when you added up all the trouble that he had gotten in, that that nomination was in much more trouble than the eventual vote made it look. And I guess the reason that I asked was that -- how much were you dealing with -- with Jackson and Vaness? Did you meet with -- with Jackson personally on this issue? Did he have to be convinced that you guys were right? Or was he already heading in that direction?

MR. NOTTI: Oh, he was -- no. His statement was he -- he said Congress was going to get (indiscernible) to deal with the issue. And his -- in his words, when they did get around to it in due time, he wanted the corpus in tact, so to speak, because he didn't want the land all divided up and have nothing to -- to grant to whatever decision he made.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Now, did he -- I know that's sort of his on the -- on the position on the hearing record. Did -- did you guys meet with him privately about this? I mean, did he -- was that his -- his view going into this? Or did you guys really have to sell him on this idea?

MR. NOTTI: No. I think it was his view. Everything that he did told me that, that he believed it.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, there's -- there's one other thing that I just remembered that I think is probably important that we ought to talk about on the tape. And that is something that we were chatting about yesterday. And that is this whole business about whether or not this is really a negotiation in terms of the kind of control that the Native community was really able to -- to -- when it got right down to it to, exercise on the -- on the process.

MR. NOTTI: I think we influenced the -- the terms of the bill and the land size. The money I don't think we influenced that much. We -- if we had our way we would have had a lot more money. The -- when it came right down to putting out the final bill, they went behind closed doors and came out with the bill and just handed it to us and that was it. After four or five years of testifying and lobbying -- in the end they -- they said, "Here it is."

MR. MITCHELL: Now, in terms of your retirement, were you -- were you back for the conference at all, or were you still down in Sitka?

MR. NOTTI: I was in Sitka.

MR. MITCHELL: You were in Sitka, okay.

MR. NOTTI: Then one other thing was -- I said earlier today that this was a social experiment, because the government at that time was spending \$100 million a year on the, quote, "Indian

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problem." And the situation on the reservations was like it had been for 100 years. Poor achievement in school, high unemployment, poor housing, the worst health statistics in America. And so Congress was casting about for something different when they passed this. And -- and we -- we rolled the times. First of all, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was just being implemented. The Vietnam War was -- the protests were in full swing. I was back there in November when 300,000 people marched on the White House in protest. They started at the Arlington National Cemetery, and they walked across the Key Bridge, and they had candles in -- inside of a paper cup at night. They walked silently past the White House and down to the steps of the Capital and blew out the light. And they had a name of a soldier -- a dead American around their neck and they took the name off and threw it into a casket -- open casket there. And it was really moving to see these 300,000 people -- as far as you could see these -- in the night, these candles. So we were arriving -- they had -- there was a lot of unrest in America. And I -- I didn't think -- we used to say Native rights -- land rights are not in question. What's being tested is the American system. Will it respond to minorities from a state that has only three electoral votes, or will it just -- like you're doing at the Vietnam just -- just neglect the (indiscernible) of the people. So -- but I think all of these things combined --

MR. MITCHELL: Well, now, what about the -- the sort of Indian power movement that was pouring out at that point? The -- I think, actually the month you got back there No- -- November '69 -- well, I guess you had been there a little bit -- was to take over of Alcatraz.

MR. NOTTI: Uh-huh.

MR. MITCHELL: And that obviously was going on all through 1970. Obviously later there was the BIA takeover and all that stuff, but that was -- that was later.

MR. NOTTI: All -- all these things ended up -- as well as another debate, strange enough, the SST debate. And I remember going down there for a hearing -- said you can testify at 2:00. And show up and say all hearings have been canceled. SST debate has been going on all day and is likely to go on tomorrow, so we waited two or three days. Our issue wasn't important enough nationally to be -- be pushed aside. And that's why when I went to Seattle to talk to Northwest Federated Tribes -- about 800 people in the audience -- that's when I made my separate nation speech. And my purpose was I couldn't go down and say we've been testifying for three years. That's not news. I wanted something to hit the paper. So I said if -- if they can't see the way clear to give us 40 million acres, that I would recommend the board of directors -- that we go to the United Nations or the World Corps. And it -- it had its effect -- the effect I wanted. It hit all the local papers down there, which was Jackson's territory. All the tribes down there were supporting us, and then I got -- I don't know how people found me, but I had clippings from Missouri and Arkansas where my story hit the AP. And I wanted these senators to pick up a paper and say, "What's this separate nation in Alaska thing? What's this all about?" Because we were swamped by Vietnam, we were swamped by SST debates. We were swamped by all the issues, and I wanted to bubble it up to the top somehow. And in some small way I think it -- it helped.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. Well, you certainly caught Atwood's attention. He took it all quiet.

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MR. NOTTI: He gave me a personal editorial about the --

MR. MITCHELL: Right, right. He did. The other thing about that is one of the ways that it might have gotten out, and maybe it's something else I didn't ask you about is -- is that I think it was in late '69. It could have been -- no, it was late '69. It was -- it was Bill Byler and the association on American Indian Affairs -- I think started off with a trying to have a national media campaign. Do you remember all that? Was that helpful at all or was that just sort of on the peripheral of your activity?

MR. NOTTI: Bill never really supported AFN. He supported Tanana Chiefs in (indiscernible). Put a lot of money into -- into them. But he raised a lot of money on the issue too. So it was as much help for him as it was for us.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. So, like, environmentalist and analyze.

MR. NOTTI: Right.

MR. MITCHELL: Did -- do you remember -- he had some guy named Fraiser Barron (phonetic) working with him. Do you remember anything at all?

MR. NOTTI: I remember -- I remember the name but --

MR. MITCHELL: I remember those guys kicking around town. Okay. Well, I've sort of run through my list. Do you have anything else you think that we haven't talked about that would be good for the people to know about?

MR. NOTTI: No. I can't think of anything else.

MR. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, great, I very much once again, appreciate it. It's been great fun for me.

MR. NOTTI: I'll be interested in seeing your report.

MR. MITCHELL: Right. (End of recording.)